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THE SOCIO-CULTURAL IMPACT OF  
THE WAR OF AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE  
UPON LIVERPOOL, 1775-1783 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The War of American Independence (1775-1783) was a significant eighteenth 
century conflict. It began as an internal revolt within the British Empire, pitting the 
mother country against thirteen rebellious colonies in North America. Both 
protagonists clashed over economic, social, and political differences. However, the 
publication of the Declaration of Independence by the United States in 1776 
transformed this struggle into a revolutionary duel. Indeed, it set American 
republicanism against British monarchism. Following the defeat of British forces at 
Saratoga in upstate New York in 1777, the conflict gradually escalated into a global 
war between Britain and its European rivals (France, Spain, and the Netherlands). 
After the British failure at Yorktown, Virginia, in 1781, the Westminster Parliament 
voted to suspend military operations in North America. Two years later the Treaty of 
Paris was signed, which recognised US independence.1  
Numerous historians have analysed how this conflict impacted upon the 
British Isles. 2  Stephen Conway is chief amongst them, and found that the war 
produced both positive and negative economic consequences. Whilst the expansion 
of the armed forces increased demand for manufactured goods, the struggle also 
disrupted overseas trade. 3  The war affected the relationship between central 
government and the localities too. Conway noted that the scale of the hostilities 
required the British state to imposed greater logistical and monetary burdens upon 
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the populous, namely in the form of paying higher taxes (this is a key characteristic 
associated with the ‘fiscal-military state’).4  But such initiatives antagonised some 
local interests, which responded by trying to shape the agenda to their advantage. 
Furthermore, in matters such as military mobilisation, the importance of local efforts 
was often evident. This challenged ministerial management, and presented the 
picture of a weak British state. On balance, whilst local elites and initiatives proved 
influential, the national state still demonstrated a formidable war-making capability.5 
Conway also addressed the theme of unity and division amongst the people. British 
opinion was clearly divided over the American War, which reflected both socio-
economic and religious differences in society. Regardless, foreign intervention in the 
conflict subsequently generated a greater sense of British patriotism.6  
Such research undoubtedly makes a valuable contribution to the 
historiography. Still, Conway and others made only few references to the port-town 
of Liverpool.7  This was probably because works on the impact of warfare upon 
Britain cannot consider every community in detail. Liverpool was a significant 
location during the long eighteenth century. The town’s population grew 
‘spectacularly’ from over 5,000 inhabitants in 1700 to almost 90,000 by century’s 
end.8 This was partially because Liverpool emerged as a major industrial centre 
within the North West regional mineral economy, consuming Lancashire coal and 
processing Cheshire salt. 9  Georgian Liverpool and the River Mersey were also 
closely linked to the Atlantic World.10 In 1702 the port owned 8,600 tons of shipping, 
but by the late-1780s this figure mushroomed to 106,000 tons. 11  Hanoverian 
Liverpool was synonymous with the trans-Atlantic slave trade, and by the 1740s the 
town was dispatching more ships to Africa than either Bristol or London.12 However, 
one can over-state the value of the African market to Liverpool, as local mercantile 
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firms often enjoyed diverse portfolios.13 Consequently, the port traded with other 
destinations, including around the British Isles and mainland Europe. By 1750 
Liverpool was second only to London in terms of the size and value of its Anglo-
American trade.14  
This article considers the socio-cultural impact of the American War upon 
Liverpool. It synthesises existing knowledge of the subject, taps into sources 
previously un-used in this context, and relates to key historiographical debates. The 
essay also redresses an imbalance in the literature on Georgian Liverpool. A large 
body of the work on the town during this period emphasises social, economic, and 
political history.15 Whilst military factors are considered in these studies, they are 
rarely given central emphasis.16 As a result, Liverpool’s involvement in eighteenth 
century wars, and the repercussions thereof, can sometimes appear side-lined. This 
article makes strides towards changing such unevenness. Three key points will be 
stressed here. The first is implicit throughout the article: that military conflict did 
impact upon British society during the eighteenth century. Indeed, some 
contemporary sources only rarely mention how warfare affected everyday life. 
Therefore, it is conceivable that war only had a limited direct impact upon the British 
population. Nonetheless, H.V. Bowen contended that this was simply not the case – 
troops did move around Britain, and civilians did encounter foreign prisoners, 
especially in south-eastern England. 17  By looking at Liverpool c.1775-1783, this 
article extends Bowen’s argument to incorporate the northern English provinces. 
More specifically, this paper supplements (and indeed supports) Conway’s work. 
Thus, the second point is an analysis of the relationship between the central British 
state and local authorities in Liverpool. During the American War, military 
considerations became increasingly evident in the town. This included the 
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construction of defences and the housing of prisoners of war. This forced both local 
and national government to interact with each other, and both were influential in 
shaping the course of events. But the directing nature of the national fiscal state 
remained present. Finally, we consider division and unity. Hanoverian Liverpool was 
a diverse society, and henceforth the revolt in the colonies split opinion within the 
town along religious and socio-economic lines. The result was that different groups 
supported and opposed the war. This disparity exposed deeper fissures within British 
imperial ideology. In Liverpool during the late-1770s and early-1780s, some locals 
used different interpretations of British imperial ideology to justify their views, either 
to back or criticise the war. The revolt in the colonies also highlighted different 
‘identities’ within Liverpool. Identity can be defined as a ‘negotiation between 
individual conceptions of self and collectivity’.18 Whereas some Liverpudlians found 
comfort in their status as Englishmen, others saw themselves as unified ‘Britons’ 
fighting against Catholic Bourbons and American republicans. These are important 
considerations, as local case studies on the impact of warfare during the eighteenth 
century often stress military mobilisation and economic impacts. This article extends 
this analysis to consider the consequences for ideology and identity too.  
 
STATE AND LOCALITY  
In peacetime Liverpool’s local government, or Corporation, worked within the 
framework prescribed by its charter. Henceforth, it enjoyed considerable ‘influence’ 
(defined here as the ability to set the agenda and to enact solutions) over local 
affairs, such as poor relief and overseeing investment in the docks.19  However, 
during wartime, although the Corporation continued to enjoy powers over local affairs 
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defined by the charter, the locality was required to interact more with national 
authorities. We will see that whilst local government could be vocal and influential in 
some matters, the ability of the national government to direct the overall war effort 
remained considerable. The powers of local government were soon tested not long 
after the commencement of hostilities. Exact details of Liverpool’s Sailors Riot of 
August 1775 vary according to individual accounts. Nonetheless, a general 
chronology of events is discernible. Riots were not unknown in eighteenth century 
Britain, and in Liverpool they were often instigated by the activities of press gangs 
and fuelled by the consumption of alcohol.20 Some contemporaries believed that the 
war in the colonies disrupted the trans-Atlantic slave trade, and consequently forced 
the laying up of a ‘great number of Guinea [African] ships’. In Liverpool up to 3,000 
sailors became unemployed, and the wages were cut for those who retained their 
jobs. On Friday 25 August, the crew of Derby responded by unrigging their vessel. 
Some offenders were committed to prison, but a gang of armed sailors later released 
them (as well as a female accomplice).21 Protesting continued into the following 
week, as mariners ransacked the homes of several merchants who had cut their 
wages. The Corporation was the first to respond to the unrest, hiring armed men and 
reading the Riot Act. But when these initiatives proved insufficient, Liverpool council 
sought assistance from elsewhere. On the Thursday troops arrived from Manchester 
and Chester, which later restored order.22  
There are additional examples of Liverpool Corporation contributing to the 
agenda, but that national considerations remained important. During the preceding 
Seven Years War of 1756-1763, there had been attempts at constructing batteries 
and a fort in Liverpool. Nevertheless, these projects were not fully completed, and so 
failed to provide adequate security for an ever-expanding port.23 With the nation 
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again at war, by 1776 the port-town was calling for enhanced defences. That autumn 
Liverpool petitioned the Privy Council for a fort and barracks to lodge two companies 
of soldiers. 24  The following May the Master-General of Ordinance reported that 
construction of a battery on a pier was insufficient, as the breadth of the Mersey 
allowed enemy vessels to fire at the docks and town. Thus, an alternative of two 
batteries was proposed, with one at Hoxhey Nook (between present-day 
Collingwood and Princes Docks) and another at Seacomb Point (on the Wirral). The 
crossfire would dissuade hostile shipping from attacking the town. But this plan 
would take two years to complete, and therefore hulks were deployed in the river as 
short-term solutions.25 Construction of a fort also commenced on the north shore by 
Princes Dock, with barracks for 500 troops. Batteries were erected by the docks as 
well.26 Whilst the construction of these defences satisfied the needs of the locality, 
the overall direction of the British state remained paramount. Liverpool Corporation 
believed that national authorities had agreed to supply the fort with gunpowder, and 
when this commodity did not arrive Liverpool petitioned Westminster to procure it.27 
But, in a sign of central authority, the Privy Council rejected Liverpool’s appeal in 
1779.28 The body reasoned that if national authorities acquiesced to this call, then it 
would prompt similar unsustainable requests from other towns.29  
Liverpool served as a detention centre for foreign prisoners of war, the 
experience of which illustrated the roles played by both local and national 
government. As a hub for privateers (private ships of war), Liverpool often witnessed 
the arrival of new inmates during wartime.30 Between 1775 and 1783 these internees 
were housed at the Tower Prison on the end of Water Street, as well as the Gaol on 
Mount Pleasant. 31 From the start of the conflict, there were American prisoners in 
Liverpool - although the exact number is uncertain.32 Then, following Bourbon entry 
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into the struggle, there were detainees from mainland Europe too. Between 1778 
and 1782, Liverpool housed 1,283 French inmates, 69 Spaniards, and 84 Dutch - 
totalling 1,436 Europeans.33 Contemporary sources show that Liverpool received 
more foreign detainees than the fellow port-town of Bristol, but did not hold as many 
foreign nationals as Mill Prison, Plymouth (which totalled 10,352 foreign inmates 
between 1777 and 1783).34 Regardless of these numbers, the housing of foreigners 
clearly imposed strains upon Liverpool’s resources. Local authorities were especially 
concerned about French and Spanish inmates, because of the ‘racial animosities’ 
between the two. 35  Thus, the Corporation actively solicited their removal from 
Liverpool, which brought the body into contact with national authorities. In November 
1778 Liverpool sent a memorial to the Privy Council, requesting that French 
detainees be transferred to an inland location.36 This yielded some results, as a 
number of inmates were conveyed to nearby Ormskirk and Chester. But the centre 
did not always acquiesce to provincial requests. Even when prisoners were moved 
from Liverpool, there were often more to take their place.37 In another sign of the 
influence of the national state, the Navy Board ordered that inmates be ‘victualled 
and supplied with clothes and necessaries’. Yet it was alleged that Mr. Oliphant, the 
agent at Liverpool, did not carry out this order with respect to the American 
prisoners. Presumably, this was because Oliphant did not regard the rebels as 
foreign prisoners, but as traitors to the mother country. The Navy Board therefore 
asserted its authority by terminating Oliphant’s employment at Liverpool.38  
Foreign prisoners in Liverpool were also subject to interrogations. Whilst 
personnel on the spot implemented this process, it seems quite possible that the 
questions were framed at a national level. Typically during the early modern period, 
there were two obvious ways of conducting intelligence gathering - either through 
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resident diplomats in other countries or networks of agents.39 However, with the 
advent of privateering at port-towns, opportunities for acquiring information multiplied. 
Enemy vessels were brought into British ports, their papers confiscated, and crews 
interrogated. Over twenty standard questions were prepared for interview, such as 
where the ship had sailed from and whether the cargo was insured. Supplementary 
questions could also follow, including details on passenger’s passports.40 Crucially, 
these interrogations shed light on the activities of local and national government. In 
Liverpool, local merchants often conducted and transcribed these examinations. For 
example, the merchant Johnson Gildart interviewed crewmembers from Canister in 
1778 at the Golden Lyon (an inn or coffee house on Dale Street). This was because 
Gildart was fluent in French.41 The importance of central government in these cross-
examinations is also inferred. Interrogation documents were highly formalised and 
conformed to a similar style, which suggests that they were centrally designed.  
Liverpool contributed numerous land forces towards eighteenth century 
conflicts. For example, the town raised a regiment to supress the 1745 Jacobite 
uprising. Later, between 1793 and 1815, Liverpool assembled several thousand 
volunteers for the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. The latter operated 
on a scale ‘larger…than ever before’ known in Liverpool’s history.42 Crucially for this 
essay, the experience of Liverpudlians serving in land forces c.1775-1783 illustrates 
the broader pattern of mobilisation during this conflict, as well as the potency of both 
local and national agency. In 1775 there were few attempts at raising land forces in 
Liverpool. This was largely because George III opposed creating new regiments. The 
monarch was worried that officers in new corps would be appointed on the basis of 
personal relationships, as opposed to military competency.43 Instead, existing corps 
were to be augmented. Thus, in early-1775 Banastre Tarleton (the son of a 
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prominent Liverpool slave trader) purchased a commission in the 1st Dragoon 
Guards. During his service in America, Tarleton incurred the wrath of the rebels for 
his allegedly bloody tactics, and he earned the praise of British commander Lord 
Cornwallis for his military skill.44  
By 1777 local initiative was clearly evident, as provincial towns pledged to 
raise regiments at their own expense. In Liverpool this was a response to the 
Declaration of Independence, which seemed to make reconciliation with America 
less likely. 45  The arrival of these new regiments divided national and military 
authorities. Whilst some officers were glad to receive fresh troops to bolster their 
numbers, others feared for the quality of the new recruits. Lord North’s government 
also suspected that volunteer regiments could be used as tools by the Opposition to 
remove government supporters in the provinces. 46  Nevertheless, the War Office 
asserted its authority, and on 8 January 1778 outlined the specifications of the 
Liverpool regiment. It would contain eight battalions, one company of grenadiers, 
and a company of light infantry. None of the enlistees were to be less than 5ft 4 
inches tall, and had to be aged 18 to 30.47 National considerations were also on 
show when the regiment received their colours. Indeed, the commanding officer 
praised his men for their loyalty. Not only would they be fighting to defend King and 
country, but they would also ‘PRESERVE THE UNION OF THE EMPIRE’. 48 
Thereafter, the Liverpool force (79th Regiment of Foot) was at the operational 
disposal of the state. Initially numbering just over one thousand men, they received 
their training in the Midlands, and were posted overseas to Jamaica. With the spread 
of global warfare, the Liverpool troops were subsequently deployed in an abortive 
attack upon Spanish America. They were later disbanded at the end of the conflict.49 
When North fell from power in 1782, he was replaced by a ministry that favoured 
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mass arming. Shelburne, the new home secretary, sent a circular to major towns 
about the desirability of forming a new militia. The result was the raising of another 
force in Liverpool 1782 – the details of which remain obscured by limited evidence.50 
These example from 1777 and 1782 show that local agency and national authority 
were important in mobilisation – even if the latter did change its positions.  
The British Navy was also mobilised to suppress the American rebellion – the 
experience of which prompted Liverpool to respond to the demands imposed upon it 
by the centre. Nevertheless, the national state overcame any local opposition in this 
field. One of the first initiatives to expand the Senior Service was the requisitioning of 
vessels from private owners. To that end, the Navy sent agents to Liverpool in 1776. 
Two local transports were forthcoming, and sent to Plymouth for refitting. However, it 
seems that no other private vessels were supplied to the state from Liverpool. 
Several craft were foreign-built, and therefore ineligible to serve in American waters 
under the terms of the Navigation Acts. The owners of some ships simply refused to 
hand over their property under the terms and conditions offered.51 This suggests that 
the localities would not always comply with the centre. Nevertheless, the overall 
picture is one where the directing nature of the state remained crucial. Several 
warships were built on the Mersey between 1777 and 1784, some of which were 
moored in the river for defensive purposes.52 Indeed, Captain John Paul Jones (often 
referred to as the ‘Father’ of the US Navy) had been sighted sailing off Whitehaven 
in 1778. The Lieutenants Logbooks of one of the vessels stationed at Liverpool, 
H.M.S. Assistance, suggests a mundane routine on-board. Crews were frequently 
mustered, sent ashore to receive supplies, and maintained the rigging. In such an 
environment several hands deserted, which prompted remaining crewmembers to go 
ashore to impress new sailors.53  
11 
 
Impressment was an issue that profoundly tested the boundaries between 
local and national government. For the most part, Liverpudlians had opposed this 
practice prior to the American War.54 In 1770 a letter from the Admiralty Office noted 
that the town’s mayor refused to support press warrants, ‘alleging that the mob, who 
are very numerous, would set fire to his house’.55 The American Revolutionary War 
proved no exception to this pattern. During this conflict ships bound for Liverpool 
often evaded the press gangs by landing some of their crews before arriving at 
port.56 The Corporation also tried to neutralise the rationale for these gangs, by 
providing bounties to encourage men to serve in the Navy.57 In addition, there were 
violent clashes between the press gangs and local community. For example, in 
March 1780 a gang assembled in front of a house in Hackins Hey, where a number 
of sailors resided. The mariners refused to open the door to the pressmen, which 
resulted in a disturbance. The outcome was that a member of the Yorkshire militia 
shot dead, and the master of the house was rushed to the infirmary.58 By 1781 press 
gangs were ‘Worried almost every excursion’ in Liverpool, and they acknowledged 
that they were fortunate to escape with their lives.59 This evidence seems to indicate 
the power of the locality. Whilst local people were undeniably active against 
impressment, this opposition did not stop national authorities. Press gangs continued 
to operate in Liverpool throughout the duration of the war, as there was a supply of 
sailors to be tapped.  
The expansion of the armed forces during the American conflict had other 
ramifications for the localities, including the provision of veterans’ charities. This was 
hardly surprising, given that the famous Greenwich Naval Hospital had been 
established almost a century earlier to house retired mariners.60 Nor was charitable 
activity in Georgian Liverpool unknown, with the establishment of hospitals and 
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schools for deprived children.61 Hence, in 1775 a local charity was established for 
soldiers serving in the colonies, as well as to support the troop’s widows and 
orphans. This scheme was funded by voluntary local subscriptions from both 
genders, and the subscribers hailed from various socio-economic backgrounds 
(including the landed elite, merchants, and retailers). Furthermore, a 26-member 
committee received these sums, and deposited them in a Liverpool bank. As of 17 
November 1775, this charity had raised £1,049. Significantly, although this was a 
Liverpool-based organisation, the scheme was modelled upon on an institution in 
London.62  
 
DIVISION AND UNITY 
In general, the American War divided opinion in Britain - and Liverpool proved to be 
no exception. However, in order to understand the patterns of local division, some 
background knowledge is first required. Georgian Liverpool was a diverse society. At 
the apex of the town stood the governing Corporation, which enjoyed powers over 
local governance. The Corporation’s membership was dominated predominantly, 
although not exclusively, by merchants. This was made possible through their wealth 
and social prestige. 63  Furthermore, many of these merchants shared business, 
familial, and religious ties, thereby preserving their influence on the council.64 In 
general, these businessmen were a clubbable people, and attended several local 
societies. Yet such organisations in Hanoverian Liverpool were rarely ‘polite’. 65 
These clubs emphasised dining and gossip, as opposed to educated cultural 
pursuits. Granted, some locals did attend the theatre and frequented the library. But 
for most of the eighteenth century, Liverpool-based societies for the advancement of 
literature and science were short-lived. Even despite the outpouring of ideas during 
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the American Revolution, this had little direct impact upon the character of 
Liverpool’s elite social clubs. In the 1790s it was claimed that ‘the only pursuit of 
[Liverpool’s] inhabitants is COMMERCE.’ It was not until the nineteenth century that 
more permanent cultural establishments emerged in the town.66  
Significantly, there were critics of the Anglican-mercantile elite that dominated 
the Corporation. The merchants themselves were hardly a single homogenous 
group, and not all of them sat on local government forums. They hailed from mixed 
social and religious backgrounds, and their businesses often enjoyed different 
remits.67 Mercantile divisions therefore emerged over personalities, and issues such 
as the funding of docks. Hence, by the mid-1770s, an independent Chamber of 
Commerce existed alongside a pro-Corporation Committee of Trade, with both 
serving as lobbying organisations.68 Furthermore, in an ever-expanding urban area, 
there were other interests besides the merchants and Corporation. Liverpool’s parish 
and probate records up to 1750 confirm that the town’s occupational structure was 
unspecialised, reflecting a range of employments such as transportation and (to a 
lesser extent) manufacturing.69 There were several houses of worship too, reflecting 
different faiths besides Anglicanism. This included churches and chapels for 
Quakers and Catholics, as well as a Jewish synagogue.70 Thus, Liverpool’s ‘civic 
elite…was increasingly isolated by and under pressure from all quarters…old and 
new political cultures were existing side-by-side’.71 These differences often surfaced 
between pro-Corporation and independent candidates during local and parliamentary 
elections.72 Hence by the time of the American Revolution, there was no one all-
encompassing Liverpool identity. Some individuals were undoubtedly proud of their 
town’s emergence as a major commercial centre during the eighteenth century. But 
because local society was pluralistic and often transitory (there was a great deal of 
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movement amongst sailors and migrant workers) this mobility frustrated the 
development of a truly Liverpudlian identity.73  
The revolt in America exposed these differences within the town. Therefore, 
local opinion was divided between the advocates of coercion against the colonists, 
and those who favoured conciliation. Such views were transmitted through different 
mediums, such as church groups and word of mouth.74 Another outlet for expression 
was print culture. Indeed, Williamson's Advertiser was established in Liverpool in 
1756, and this newspaper had a wide circulation reaching London, Glasgow, and 
Dublin.75 Splits in Liverpool over the American War soon became evident. On 11 
September 1775 Liverpool Corporation was one of the first towns to send a loyal 
address to the King calling for coercion in the colonies. The inhabitant’s address later 
that month, which also favoured coercion, collected over 500 signatures from 
gentlemen, clergy, and merchants. In contrast, a Lancashire-wide petition for 
conciliation with the colonies was produced that November. It collected 4,000 
signatures, of which 292 came from Liverpool.76 Table 1 shows a breakdown on the 
socio-economic background of the Liverpudlian signatories. It also contrasts this 
data with Bristol, which reveals some important differences between the two port-
towns. The percentage difference has been added to demonstrate the degree of 







TABLE 1 Socio-economic backgrounds of petitioners and addressers in Bristol and 
Liverpool by percentage (1775, 1780) 
    BRISTOL                 LIVERPOOL                        
  Conciliation   Coercion   Difference         Conciliation   Coercion   Difference   
Gentleman 15.0          33.2      (18.2)       18.5       28.4  (9.9) 
Merchant 15.0          20.0      (5)        35.8       27.6  (8.2) 
Retail  26.1          16.5     (9.6)       18.5      23.1  (4.6) 
Artisan 42.2          27.7     (14.5)       25.9      20.9  (5) 
Labourer 1.1          2.3     (1.2)       1.3                 0            (1.3) 
Other   0.6          0.3     (0.3)       0                  0           (0) 
TOTAL 100         100        100     100                
Source: J.E. Bradley, Religion, Revolution and English Radicalism: Nonconformity in 
Eighteenth-Century Politics and Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 
374.  
 
This data must be treated with some caution, as those who collected the signatures 
likely favoured those who were inclined the same way, and possibly did not seek the 
views of those at the bottom of society.77 Regardless, socio-economic background 
was a key factor in determining opinion. This was especially true in Bristol. Amongst 
the gentleman of that town, a noticeably greater percentage favoured coercion than 
conciliation - by as much as 18 per cent. It is believed that the upper classes held a 
greater vested interest in preserving law and order, and therefore opposed the 
Revolution. 78  Alternatively, Bristolian retailers and artisans were more inclined 
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towards conciliation. This was probably because they could ill-afford wartime 
economic dislocation.79 This socio-economic interpretation works in Liverpool too, 
but to a lesser extent. Within this sample, local gentlemen generally favoured 
coercion, whilst artisans supported conciliation. The difference in views amongst the 
Liverpool merchants was higher than in Bristol (8.2 per cent compared to 5). This 
chimes with the view that Liverpool merchants were a heterogeneous group. 
Interestingly, unlike their Bristolian counterparts, Liverpool merchants formed a 
larger percentage of conciliatory petitions than coercive addresses. Liverpool 
mercantile sentiment is even more remarkable given that, in a broader sample of 
provincial opinion, Kathleen Wilson found that by 1775 merchants generally 
supported coercion.80 Presumably Liverpool merchants took a different view because 
they enjoyed a significant volume of trade with America, and feared any economic 
backlash from coercion. This may also explain why few Liverpudlian businesses 
handed over their vessels to the government at the outbreak of hostilities (although 
they were clearly happy to accept contracts for building warships on the Mersey). 
Nevertheless, on the whole, the level of polarisation within the social-economic 
groups was less pronounced in Liverpool than Bristol. Unlike the latter, the 
percentage differences for Liverpool do not reach double figures. This correlates with 
the finding that, generally, socio-economic factors were not so important in 
determining the outcome of Liverpool elections during the Georgian era.81   
Bradley found that religion was the ‘clearest predictor of opinion over 
America’. Indeed, Presbyterians, Congregationalists, Baptists, and Quakers, were 
restricted in their political activities by the Test and Corporation Acts. Therefore, they 
were statistically rebel America’s closest friends.82 In a sample of Bristolian petitions 
and addresses, Dissenters were a significant percentage of signatories to 
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conciliatory petitions. In contrast, Anglicans leaned more towards coercion. 83  A 
similar pattern occurred in Liverpool. Within Bradley’s sample, Anglican clergy 
comprised 10 per cent of those signing coercive addresses, whilst they were a mere 
2 per cent for conciliatory petitions. Presumably Anglicans feared that the rebellion 
would challenge the position of the Church of England. In contrast, Liverpudlian 
Dissenters constituted 14.3 per cent of those signing conciliatory petitions, compared 
to 9.3 per cent for coercive addresses. However, it is significant that of those signing 
conciliatory documents, in Bristol 29.1 per cent of the signatories were Dissenters - 
whilst in Liverpool the figure for Dissenters was appreciably lower at 14.3 per cent. 
Evidently fewer Liverpudlian non-conformists displayed a preference for conciliation. 
This was due to several local factors, not least that some Liverpool Dissenters held 
interests in the trans-Atlantic slave trade. Therefore, they held a vested interest in 
preserving the established imperial order.84 
As a result of these divisions in opinion, the war unleashed a debate over the 
nature of British imperialism in Liverpool. Jack Greene argued that, in general, 
between 1688 and 1783 Britons regarded themselves as living in a Protestant and 
constitutional empire. Liberty was enshrined, people and goods were shipped across 
the seas, and the colonies contributed towards the imperial economy. 85  Yet the 
precise details of this ideology were open to debate. Often anonymously, locals on 
both sides of the debate used a key component of imperial ideology, 
constitutionalism, to justify their respective views. In its coercive address of 1775, the 
Corporation claimed that imperial authority was structured through ‘our glorious 
constitution’, which included both the monarchy and legislature. This particular 
reference supports the view that the British prosecuted the war to secure 
parliamentary sovereignty over its colonies.86 Common throughout these sources is 
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the reference to the familial relationship within the Empire, headed by the King’s 
‘paternal care’. This gave further impetus to constitutional and legalistic arguments, 
with the advocates of coercion being ‘ready and willing to exert our utmost 
Endeavours for the Discouragement of all such illegal Proceedings.’87 The people’s 
coercive address also vowed to crush the American rebellion on constitutional 
grounds, because the revolt showed ‘contempt…to the legal authority and 
constitutional power’.88 A pro-government letter in Liverpool dated 27 October 1775 
was also signed by ‘A Friend of the British Constitution’.89 Conversely, opponents of 
the war used constitutionalism to support their opinions too. A letter to the Liverpool 
General Advertiser noted that the colonists constituted ‘no efficient part’ of the 
Westminster Parliament. This raised the prospect that the Americans were ‘no longer 
subjects, but slaves’ (an issue that will be discussed below). The same author then 
decried the impolitic nature of the situation: ‘Would not an Englishman be moved 
with indignation, was he to be told, that what he procured….was at the disposal of an 
American power!’90 This evidence from Liverpool supports Wilson’s argument that 
the American War provoked a crisis in British imperialism.91 There was clearly a 
schism between an earlier form of imperial ideology that had a ‘libertarian fervour’, 
and the empire of authority that emerged by mid-century. The latter was a more 
controlled response to the difficulties of managing an empire, which had expanded 
its territorial borders after 1763.92  
The previous reference to slavery invites a brief discussion of Liverpool’s 
association with this activity during the War of Independence. Indeed, because 
Britain, Africa, and America, were part of the ‘triangular trade’, the outbreak of war 
affected trans-Atlantic slavery. Even in peacetime, this business was subject to great 
uncertainty. Fluctuations in supply and demand, as well as events during individual 
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voyages, resulted in both sizable profits and losses.93 After 1775 Liverpool slavers 
had to respond to an even more uncertain environment. Initially the trade was not 
prosecuted with the ‘usual spirit’, but it was ‘far from being at a stand’.94 However, by 
1779 things had changed. William Davenport, a prominent Liverpool slave trader, 
noted that the African market had been ‘dead for sometime’.95 This was because an 
Order in Council, issued by George III, restricted the exportation of gunpowder 
overseas from the UK.96 Liverpool slavers were adversely affected because they 
used gunpowder for defence and barter on the African coast. In addition, trade was 
complicated by American (and eventually European) privateers attacking British 
vessels. One Liverpudlian captain remarked that when US privateers captured 
enemy slaving vessels, they engaged in economic warfare by selling Africans at 
discount - in a bid to undercut British slave traders. 97  These problems were 
exacerbated by rising maritime insurance costs.98 British colonists in the West Indies 
also recognised that they were vulnerable to Bourbon attacks. Richard Watt, a trader 
in Jamaica with Liverpool connections, noted:  ‘if France and Spain declares 
war…we here are badly situated…I am afraid they Spaniards will appoint a 
Governor’. The same letter speculated that there would be reduced demand for 
colonial sugar in Liverpool, and a rise in mercantile bankruptcies.99 Thus, Davenport 
lost as much as £1,000 on several slave voyages between 1775 and 1783. However, 
there were also instances when he earned £4,000 profit during this period. 100 
Davenport’s is a mixed picture, and it is not certain how reflective he was of other 
Liverpool slave traders (he is frequently cited because his manuscripts have survived 
in detail). What can be said with greater certainty is that the American War did not 
destroy Liverpool’s participation in trans-Atlantic slavery. This would officially end in 
1807, with the abolition of the slave trade.   
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Socio-culturally, there was some abolitionist sentiment in Liverpool during the 
American conflict. In 1777 a poem written by William Roscoe (a local religious 
Dissenter and lawyer) entitled Mount Pleasant was published. It noted that 
Liverpool’s ‘splendid tracks of opulence’ were built upon the toils of ‘AFRIC’s [sic] 
swarthy sons’, which constituted a ‘Shame to Mankind!’101 However, it is not clear if 
there was a direct correlation between the decision to publish and the timing of the 
American Revolution. Indeed, there was little evidence of broader abolitionism in the 
town during the war. This reinforces the view that for many years there was virtually 
no organised anti-slavery activity in Liverpool. Instead, local abolitionist sentiment 
relied heavily upon individuals that debated the topic. Evidently, the American 
Revolution did not catalyse the abolitionist cause in Liverpool. This is unsurprising 
given the commercial value of the trade to the town, and the physical risk posed to 
those who advocated its end. More importantly, the American Revolution’s attitude 
towards African servitude was ambiguous. Although the Declaration of 
Independence proclaimed that ‘all men are created equal’, slavery continued in the 
US into the mid-nineteenth century. Thus, it would not be until after the 
establishment of the Society for the Abolition of the Slave Trade in 1787, at the 
earliest, that there was more formal abolitionist organisation in Liverpool.102  
The Revolutionary War also highlighted the different identities within 
Liverpool, one of which was Englishness. Indeed, a letter from November 1775 
stressed the fair character of the ‘English Constitution’, and the good nature of 
‘Englishmen’. As a result, there should have been a fair reconciliation with 
America.103  However, there were others in Liverpool that one might refer to as 
‘Britons’. Linda Colley postulated that eighteenth century warfare contributed towards 
the development of British national identity. She argued that Hanoverian conflicts 
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were wars of religion, pitting Protestant Britain against Catholic France and Spain. 
These clashes were also political struggles between the Hanoverian and Bourbon 
dynasties. Consequently, a British national identity emerged, which stressed 
Protestantism and elevated the monarchy to symbolise a nation unified in arms.104 
Indeed, Liverpool Corporation’s minute book made several references to ‘Britain’ and 
‘British’ during the years 1775-1783.105  However, not all inhabitants of Liverpool 
regarded themselves as ‘Britons’. The above references to Englishness suggest that 
the historic patriotisms of the sub-nations of the United Kingdom formed competing 
claims to Britishness.106 This is not surprising, given the transient and multiple socio-
religious groups in Georgian Liverpool.  
Regardless, what did it mean to be a patriotic ‘Briton’ in Liverpool during the 
War of Independence? Some contemporaries defined themselves by attacking the 
‘Other’, and contrasted foreign powers with allegedly superior British values. In due 
course the Americans themselves were regarded as being foreign, and not British. 
This had not been apparent at the start of the war, when both the proponents of 
coercion and conciliation regarded the colonists as their brethren. The Corporation’s 
1775 Loyal Address referred to ‘our fellow subjects in America’. 107  Equally, an 
advocate of conciliation wrote about the spilling of ‘kindred blood’.108 Even by the 
middling stages of the conflict, the Corporation still regarded the colonists as fellow 
British subjects. It sent another memorial to the Crown in 1779, referring to ‘your 
Majesty’s revolted colonies in America.’109 Yet towards the end of the war there was 
a hardening of attitudes against the colonists. This led to comparisons between 
wholesome ‘Britons’ and disloyal rebels. At the 1780 parliamentary election, a 
Liverpool voter urged his fellow freemen to elect a ‘Gentlemen of Independent 
Fortune’, who was a friend to the King and ‘present Happy Constitution’. Local 
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electors should absolutely not support the ‘Abettors of American Rebellion or 
promoters of Petitions and Associations of a Republican Faction’.110 The entry of the 
Bourbon powers into the war intensified the fervour of those Liverpudlians who 
regarded themselves as patriotic ‘Britons’. As a result, their criticisms of the 
European powers became intense. A locally published poem from the early-1780s, 
entitled The Dismember’d Empire, charged that ‘Gallia’ was the first to ‘put in force 
the foul, malignant plan’. This had then been followed by ‘Iberia’. Equally, the 
protestant Dutch were dismissed as ‘low thoughted’. 111  During the 1780 poll, a 
Liverpool campaign song also mocked French ‘frogs’, and contrasted the allegedly 
impure French symbols with virtuous British beef and ‘Liverpool Ale’.112  
Moreover, these loyal ‘Britons’ criticised those who did not measure up to this 
vision of loyal gentlemen consuming beef and ale, and therefore sought to 
marginalise them. This was largely due to the deteriorating military and diplomatic 
environment, and some people began looking for the enemy within.113 There were 
several such targets in Liverpool, including Sir William Meredith MP. First elected to 
represent the town in Parliament in 1761, Meredith had initially supported coercion. 
But following British defeat at Saratoga in 1777, Sir William gravitated towards the 
parliamentary Opposition - elements of which advocated peace at the cost of US 
independence.114 Thus, during the 1780 election some electors branded Meredith a 
traitor: the MP had allegedly ‘told us that…we must not fight, That America should 
over England prevail’. This supposedly unpatriotic parliamentarian was juxtaposed 
with virtuous Liverpudlians, who had previously defeated the Jacobites, and who 
now fought on the High Seas.115 Richard Pennant, the town’s other parliamentarian, 
had been a supporter of conciliation since 1775.116 Consequently, he was labelled 
the ‘worthy colleague’ of the American revolutionary Benjamin Franklin.117 To ensure 
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that Pennant would be defeated in 1780, the pseudonym Benevolus urged his peers 
to vote for another candidate who had ‘not a single Seed of rebellion in his 
disposition’.118 In the event, Meredith did not stand for re-election, and Pennant was 
defeated by the Corporation’s preferred candidates. There were several reasons for 
Meredith’s resignation, including illness, long-standing opposition from Liverpool 
council, and that he had made enemies by changing political allegiances in 
Westminster.119 Equally, whilst Pennant was often regarded as being amiable, he 
was perceived by some as indolent. 120  Nevertheless, by 1780 Meredith’s and 
Pennant’s views on America did not endear them to the patriotic ‘Britons’ in the 
Liverpool electorate, which made them liable to criticism and contributed towards 
their political misfortunes.   
 
CONCLUSIONS  
This essay has analysed the socio-cultural aspects of the War of American 
Independence (1775-1783) upon the port-town of Liverpool. In doing so, it helps fill a 
gap in the historiography, as several studies on Britain and the American Revolution 
rarely mentioned Liverpool in detail. Conway’s analysis of the war stressed the 
themes of locality and centre, as well as unity and division. This work considered 
these issues too, thereby supplementing and supporting Conway’s work. By looking 
at the housing of prisoners of war, construction of defences, and interaction with the 
armed forces, it is evident that military considerations became more obvious in 
Liverpool between 1775 and 1783. Henceforth, this prompted the town to 
increasingly interact with central government. The town’s Corporation successfully 
lobbied for some concessions from the national government – although the overall 
direction of the national fiscal-military state was ever-present. Evidently, the 
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interaction between local and national government was a complex process. In 
addition, the American rebellion divided opinion within Liverpool, reflecting socio-
economic and religious divisions in the town. The War of Independence also 
revealed the schism within British imperial ideology. In Liverpool both the proponents 
of coercion and conciliation used constitutionalism to justify their views. 
Penultimately, the war illustrated competing identities within the town, with some 
Liverpudlians finding solace in their status as patriotic ‘Britons’ fighting Catholic 
Bourbons and US republicans, whilst others saw themselves as Englishmen. 
Combined, this body of evidence shows that eighteenth century warfare did impact 
upon British society.  
On a final note, in some respects Liverpool shared characteristics with other 
English towns during the American War. Like Bristol, it was polarised by splits in 
opinion, was subject to naval impressment, and housed foreign prisoners of war. But 
there were some differences too (which local case studies such as this illustrate). 
Whilst Liverpool undoubtedly suffered physical violence as a result of the 1775 
Sailors Riot, there seems to have been no example of a foreign power or their British 
sympathisers directly attacking Liverpool. This stood in contrast with Portsmouth and 
Bristol, where James Aitkin (an American-sympathising Scot alias ‘John the Painter’) 
aimed to destroy rope-houses and ships moored at the quayside. 121  Liverpool 
presumably escaped this fate because of the military presence in the town, and 
because Aitkin was caught and hanged in 1777.122 Furthermore, contrary to the 
broader national trend, the Liverpool’s merchants favoured conciliation over 
coercion. Liverpudlian Dissenters were also less opposed to coercion than their 
counterparts elsewhere. These differences reflected local circumstances in the town. 
A future project may fully determine whether Liverpool’s alleged cultural 
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exceptionalism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (in the words of one author 
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